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Following the invasion of Iraq, the American-run Coalition Provisional 
Authority (“CPA”) introduced a series of Orders and Regulations that 
restructured the foreign investment landscape in that country. Some of these 
regulations, and the political story behind their implementation, have 
received scholarly attention. However, few commentators have analyzed the 
body of CPA-issued regulations for provisions relevant to foreign investment. 
This paper traces the evolution of investment law in occupied Iraq through a 
detailed evaluation of CPA-issued Orders and Regulations. Analysis of these 
regulations, of pre-existing US policy on foreign investment, and of criteria 
used to measure foreign investment regulation reveals the extent to which 
the CPA regime installed in Iraq is intensely pro-foreign investor and reflects 
a policy commitment to opening developing markets to foreign investment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As early as 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United 
States (“NSS”) proclaimed the promotion of economic freedom 
“beyond America’s shores” as a pillar of its defense policy. Specifically, 
the US asserted that it would engage with other countries to promote 
“pro-growth legal and regulatory policies to encourage business 
investment.”277 Following the invasion of Iraq, the American-run 
Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”) introduced a series of Orders 
and Regulations that restructured the foreign investment landscape in 
that country. Some of these laws, and the political story behind their 
implementation, have received scholarly attention.278 However, few 
commentators have analyzed the body of CPA-issued regulations for 
provisions relevant to foreign investment.  
This paper traces the evolution of investment law in occupied 
Iraq through a detailed analysis of CPA-issued Orders and 
Regulations. I argue that the legal regime installed in this period is 
pro-foreign investor and reflects a US policy commitment to opening 
developing markets to foreign investment. Part One lays out the 
policy context in which the CPA operated. Part Two illustrates the 
investment picture established through CPA laws on de-
Ba’athification, tax, immunities, and foreign investment. Part Three 
compares the CPA investment scheme with pre-invasion US policy 
and addresses the international law of occupation. Part Four tests the 
extent to which the package of incentives and restrictions contained 
in CPA-issued laws represent an investor-friendly scheme using three 
measures of the treatment of foreign investment.  
It is worth noting that there may be some debate as to 
whether non-Iraqi companies contracted to provide services in Iraq 
should be considered foreign investors.279 However, the CPA, which 
                                                            
277 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, The White 
House (September 2002) at 17 [NSS]. 
278 See e.g. Nicole Marie Crum, “Liberalization or Economic Colonization: The 
Legality of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Structural Investment Law Reforms 
in Post-Conflict Iraq” (2005) 2 South Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Business 49; See also Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster 
Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007). 
279 See, e.g. Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: 
2007, Oxford University Press) at 73-80. 
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was the body that concluded agreements with foreign contractors on 
behalf of Iraq, came to define “foreign investment” as “investment in 
any kind of asset in Iraq” including “technical expertise.”280 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) 
jurisprudence also supports the position that contracts for the 
provision of services constitute international investments, so long as 
the contracting party has made contributions in the host country that 
are certain in duration, of economic value (such as labour and 
services), and involve some risk for the contractor.281 For the purposes 
of this paper, it is assumed on that basis that foreign contractors 
providing services in Iraq constitute foreign investors.    
 
1. THE POLICY CONTEXT 
 
A brief review of US policy on international investment will 
help set the context in which the CPA operated. Before the invasion 
of Iraq, the White House established the liberalization of investment 
law in developing markets as a pillar of US defense policy. The US 
State Department agreed and made recommendations on how to 
implement this policy in Iraq. Both sets of documents are reviewed 
below. 
 
1.1 International Investment and US Foreign Policy before the 
Occupation of Iraq 
The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy of the 
United States of 2002 has featured prominently in political and legal 
scholarship because of its articulation of the doctrine of preemptive 
self-defense.282 However, another defense policy commitment 
articulated in that White House-issued document has proven 
extremely relevant for Iraq: promoting law reform in emerging 
markets to encourage international flows of investment capital. “The 
lessons of history are clear,” the NSS proclaims, “market economies … 
                                                            
280 Order Number 39 (Foreign Investment), Coalition Provisional Authority (19 
September 2003), s 1(3) [Order 39]. 
281 See e.g. L.E.S.I. S.p.A. et ASTALDI S.p.A. v Republique Algerienne Democratique 
et Populaire (2006), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3 (International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes). 
282 See e.g., Colin L. Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships” (2004) 83 Foreign Affairs 22. 
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are the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty.”283 The 
organizing principle would be “a world in which all countries have 
investment-grade credit ratings that allow them access to 
international capital markets and to invest in their future.”284 One of 
the featured methods of achieving this goal was the promotion of 
“pro-growth legal and regulatory policies to encourage business 
investment” and “tax policies—particularly lower marginal tax rates—
that improve incentives for work and investment.”285 International 
investment was seen as one of the primary means of encouraging 
development, which, in turn, would encourage stability and enhance 
US security. The importance of international investment to US 
defense policy was thus identified before the invasion of Iraq: “Free 
markets and free trade are key priorities of our national security 
strategy.”286 
This position was echoed by a collection of several hundred 
government officials and Iraqi exiles gathered by the US State 
Department to form The Future of Iraq Project (“FIP”). Between July 
2002 and April 2003, the group held dozens of meetings to discuss the 
needs of post-invasion Iraq.287 The subject-specific working group 
reports, completed in 2003 and declassified in 2005, are consistent in 
their support for reducing barriers to foreign investment in Iraq. For 
example, the Oil and Energy Working Group report asserts that 
“Iraq’s economy upon liberation will be in need of billions of dollars 
of foreign direct investment” and encourages the establishment of 
new “terms” and “conditions” to induce such funds.288 The Economy 
and Infrastructure Working Group struck a similar tone, insisting on 
“creating a favorable investment climate for foreign investors” as a 
first step to encourage growth.289 International investment was seen as 
the key to “invigorate Iraq’s economy and lift the Iraqi people out of a 
                                                            
283 NSS, supra note 1 at 17. 
284 Ibid at 18. 
285 Ibid at 17. 
286 NSS, supra note 1 at 23. 
287 Robert Bejesky, “Geopolitics, Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market 
Expectations” (2011) 63 Oklahoma Law Review 193 at 216-218. 
288 “Oil & Energy Working Group: The Future of Iraq Project”, US Department of 
State (2003, declassified in part on June 22, 2005) at 9 [FIP—Oil & Energy]. 
289 “Economy and Infrastructure (Public Finance) Working Group: The Future of Iraq 
Project”, US Department of State (2003, declassified in part on June 22, 2005) at 5 
[FIP—Economy & Infrastructure].  
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future of impoverishment.”290 The invasion of Iraq was considered an 
appropriate method to implement the necessary reforms: “regime 
change provides the opportunity to liberate not only the country but 
also the economy.”291 In effect, the FIP was a practical application to 
Iraq of the NSS defense policy commitment to encouraging 
international investment in developing economies.  
 
2. THE COALITIONAL PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
A full picture of the legal regime governing international 
investment in Iraq emerges from a detailed review of the Orders 
issued by the CPA while it was in power (12 April 2003 – 28 June 
2004). Few, if any studies, have examined these regulations in detail. 
Although only one Order governs international investment directly 
(Order 39), a number of other Orders contain provisions that are 
relevant to international investors. This section focuses on regulation 
in four areas. First, “De-Ba’athification” (Order 1) resulted in a purge 
of many technical experts from the Iraqi public sector and created a 
range of opportunities for the provision of services and expertise by 
foreign investors. Second, legal immunity from US judicial process 
was extended to international investors with interests in Iraqi 
petroleum products (US Executive Order 13303) and to foreign 
contractors operating in Iraq from Iraqi judicial process (Order 17). 
Third, tax provisions (Order 37 and Order 49) protected foreign 
contractors and investors in Iraq from all tax liability. And finally, 
Order 39 (“Foreign Investment”) provided additional incentives 
specifically designed to induce foreign investment in Iraq.  
At the outset, it is worth noting that, although many CPA 
Orders discussed below specify the period of time in which they 
would be in force, the final Order issued before the CPA’s dissolution 
and the governing document of the Iraqi Interim Government that 
took the CPA’s place extended the validity of CPA provisions until 
they are specifically contradicted by Iraqi law. The transition from 
CPA authority to Iraqi sovereignty is discussed further at 2.5.  
 
                                                            
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid. 
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2.1 De-Ba’athification and Foreign Expertise  
The first Order issued by the CPA, once it assumed authority 
in Iraq, mandated the removal of members of the Ba’ath Party from 
public sector jobs.292 On its face, the motivation behind the move was 
a concern with the re-emergence of elements of the previous regime 
in the post-invasion political order.293 The Order therefore expelled 
anyone holding the rank of “Regional Command Member,” “Branch 
Member,” or “Section Member” in the Ba’ath Party from public 
office.294 However, Order 1 also applied to “individuals holding 
positions in the top three layers of management in every national 
government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government 
institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals).”295 Such individuals were 
to be interviewed for “possible affiliation” with the Ba’ath Party. This 
provision excluded both senior members of the Ba’ath Party and those 
holding the more junior ranks of “Member” and “Active Member” 
from management positions in the public sector.296  
Targeting junior Ba’ath Party members in the public service 
resulted in a “crippling” purge of management and technical 
specialists from a number of ministries and public institutions.297 In 
turn, the need for technical expertise throughout the Iraqi public 
sector represented an opportunity for foreign investors. Three months 
after Order 1 was issued, the CPA published a memorandum on 
contract and grant procedures that lists “technical expertise” as one of 
the factors used to evaluate prospective contractors.298 A CPA 
Inspector General audit notes that offers by foreign contractors 
responding to CPA-issued Requests for Proposals were evaluated 
primarily on the basis of “the offerors’ experience and expertise.”299 
The CPA would later include “technical expertise” in its definition of 
                                                            
292 Order Number 1 (De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society), Coalition Provisional 
Authority (16 May 2003) [Order Number 1].  
293 Ibid, s 1(1). 
294 Ibid, s 1(2). 
295 Ibid, s 1(3) 
296 Ibid. 
297 Greg Muttitt, Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Iraq (London: The Bodley Head, 
2011) at 86. 
298 Memorandum Number 4 (Contract and Grant Procedures), Coalition Provisional 
Authority (19 August 2003), s 7(3)(c). 
299 “Award of Sector Design-Build Construction Contracts: Report Number 04-005”, 
Office of the Inspector General Coalition Provisional Authority (23 July 2004) at 16. 
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“foreign investment” which brought foreign experts within the ambit 
of provisions designed to induce foreign investors in Iraq (discussed at 
2.4).300  
Consulting contracts with foreign companies were eventually 
concluded in the areas of local governance, democracy building, 
agriculture, banking, public health, airport and seaport 
administration, education, housing, and the development of civil 
society.301 Although the precise value of these contracts is unknown, 
the relatively small number of Iraqis hired by the CPA to work for the 
reconstruction is a reflection of the scale of the opportunity the “De-
Ba’athification” of Iraq represented for foreign investors.302 
 
2.2 Immunity for Foreign Investors 
The second aspect of the investment regime that warrants 
scrutiny is the provision of immunity to foreign entities with interests 
in Iraq. These protections granted near-total immunity to 
international investors from US and Iraqi judicial process. In the early 
days of the occupation (May 2003), the White House issued a 
presidential Executive Order protecting international investors in 
Iraqi petroleum products from judicial proceedings in the US. The 
order provided immunity against “any attachment, judgment, decree, 
lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process.”303 The 
protection was extended to the Development Fund of Iraq and to:  
all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products, and interests 
therein, and proceeds, obligations, or any financial 
instruments of any nature whatsoever arising from or related 
to the sale or marketing thereof, and interests therein, in 
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any 
interest, that are in the United States, that hereafter come 
                                                            
300 See the introduction for a discussion of the provision of services as international 
investment. 
301 See e,g Honourable Frank R. Wolf, “Remarks in the House of Representatives” 
(June 10, 2003) in 149 Congressional Record Part II at 1457; See also Shane Harris, 
“Outsourcing Iraq” (2004) 36 Government Executive 11. 
302 Rajiv Chandasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006) at 326.  
303 “Executive Order Protecting the Development Fund of Iraq and Certain other 
Property in Which Iraq Has an Interest (13303)”, The White House (22 May 2003), s 
1. 
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within the United States, or that are or hereafter come 
within the possession or control of United States persons.304  
Because of the significance of oil to the Iraqi economy—oil represents 
70 percent of Iraq’s Gross Domestic Product and 95 percent of Iraqi 
government revenue—this measure appears to shield a range of 
foreign investors in Iraq from judgments issued in US legal system.305  
Shortly after, the CPA granted international investors broad 
immunity from Iraqi law. Order 17 applies to both foreign contractors 
(defined as “non-Iraqi business entities or individuals not normally 
resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or services to or on behalf of 
Coalition Forces or the CPA under contractual obligations”) and 
foreign sub-contractors (defined as “non-Iraqi business entities or 
individuals not normally resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or 
services to or on behalf of Coalition contractors and in respect of 
Coalition or CPA activities under contractual arrangements”), among 
others.306 The Order provides that foreign contractors, sub-
contractors, and their employees are not subject to Iraqi laws or 
regulations “in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their 
contracts in relation to the Coalition Forces or the CPA,” for actions 
with respect to “licensing and registration of employees, businesses 
and corporations in relation to such contracts,” and for “acts 
performed … within their official activities pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of a contract … and any sub-contract thereto.”307 With 
respect to actions and omissions by contractors, sub-contractors and 
their employees not performed pursuant to contracts, no Iraqi legal 
process could be commenced “without the written permission of the 
CPA.”308 This latter provision effectively shields foreign contractors in 
Iraq from Iraqi jurisdiction, subject to CPA authorization to the 
contrary. These immunities were to last only for the period of 
authority of the CPA, however, later provisions issued by the CPA 
                                                            
304 Ibid, s 1(a). 
305 Daniel Behn, “Sharing Iraq’s Oil: Analyzing Production-Sharing Contracts Under 
the Final Draft Petroleum Law” (2007) 4 Oil, Gas and Energy Law (no pagination in 
journal). 
306 Order Number 17 (Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, Their 
Personnel, and Contractors), Coalition Provisional Authority (26 June 2003), s 1(3), 
1(5).  
307 Ibid, ss 3(1), 3(2). 
308 Ibid, s 3(3).  
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and the Iraqi interim government stipulated that CPA Orders would 
remain in force unless specifically overturned by Iraqi law (discussed 
at 2.5). 
 
2.3 Limited Tax Liability for Foreign Investors 
The CPA issued two tax-specific Orders, one for calendar year 
2003 (Order 37) and a second for calendar year 2004 and beyond 
(Order 49), both of which contain provisions relevant to international 
investors. Order 37, issued on September 15, applied retroactively 
from date of issuance to the whole calendar year and outlines a 
number of incentives designed to attract foreign capital to post-
invasion Iraq. The Order defines tax broadly as “any tax or charge 
having the effect of a tax” including, without limitation, any tax or 
“levy, duty, withholding, or fee.”309 It goes on to suspend all income 
tax for assessed income sources enumerated in the Iraqi Income Tax 
Law (113) of 1982.310 Moreover, no Iraqi tax would apply to the 
contractors and sub-contractors of the CPA or to the contractors and 
sub-contractors of any department or agency of Coalition Forces’ 
governments.311 All Iraqi law inconsistent with the Order was 
suspended.312 In addition, the Order mandated that individual and 
corporate income tax rate for the years following (meaning 2004 and 
beyond) would not exceed 15 percent.313 Through these provisions, 
foreign investors in Iraq were effectively protected from tax or other 
government-imposed liabilities for 2003, and provided with a 
guaranteed ceiling of 15 percent on any future tax liability in the 
country. Few jurisdictions in the region offer foreign investors the 
same certainty against short or medium-term encumbrances on 
revenue: even though many Middle Eastern economies are ranked 
amongst the lowest-taxing countries in the world, the average total 
tax rate remains 25.4%.314     
Order 49 for 2004 introduced a more specific tax regime while 
maintaining many of the incentives for foreign investors introduced 
                                                            
309 Order Number 37 (Tax Strategy for 2003), Coalition Provisional Authority (15 
September 2003). 
310 Ibid, s 2(a).  
311 Ibid, s 3(2). 
312 Ibid, s 7. 
313 Ibid, s 4. 
314 “Paying Taxes 2012: The Global Picture”, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) at 82.  
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in Order 37. The suspension of Iraqi tax laws was lifted with two 
modifications to the domestic tax scheme. First, Order 49 codifies the 
guarantee in Order 37 that no tax rate in the country would exceed 15 
percent by introducing language to this effect in the domestic Iraqi 
tax code.315 Second, foreign companies that are “registered in Iraq or 
otherwise have a permanent establishment in Iraq” would enjoy a 
fixed 15 percent tax rate, well below the previously established rate in 
Iraq or the average rate in the region.316 The Order also grants tax-
exempt status to a broad range of foreign investors. Foreign 
contractors and subcontractors who have concluded agreements with 
the CPA, foreign countries cooperating with Coalition Forces, or 
departments and agencies of Coalition Forces’ governments are 
eligible for exemption from any tax “or similar charge” in Iraq.317 Any 
foreign contractors “providing technical, financial, logistical, 
administrative, or other assistance to Iraq” qualify for the 
exemption.318 The immunity from tax liability applies to income 
earned from foreign sources and from sources in Iraq, and extends to 
all non-Iraqi employees of said contractors and subcontractors.319 
Although issued at the end of February 2004, the Order stipulates that 
its’ provisions would apply retroactively from the beginning of that 
year. No end date is enumerated.    
Order 49 establishes a two-tier tax system in Iraq with foreign 
investors securing better than national treatment. While Iraqi entities 
were liable for assessment under the reinstituted Iraqi tax scheme, 
foreign contractors (and their employees) that concluded agreements 
with the CPA or other governments cooperating with Coalition 
Forces were guaranteed immunity from tax liability so long as they 
were deemed to be providing “assistance to Iraq.” Although Iraq is not 
alone in granting tax incentives to foreign investors unavailable to 
national investors, Order 49 is unique in the region for immunizing 
most foreign investors indefinitely from all tax liability.320 
                                                            
315 Order Number 49 (Tax Strategy of 2004), Coalition Provisional Authority (29 
February 2004), s 3(1).  
316 Ibid, s 3(3). 
317 Ibid, s 4(3). 
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid.  
320 See e.g. A. Rohan Perera, “The Role and Implications of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties” (2000) 26 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 607 at 621. 
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2.4 Provisions Specific to International Investors (Order 39) 
While the immunity and tax provisions issued by the CPA 
provide strong incentives to foreign investors, Order 39 is the heart of 
the CPA-designed foreign investment scheme in Iraq. Its provisions, 
reviewed below in detail, structured the foreign investment 
environment in Iraq until 2006, when the first permanent 
government of Iraq passed a new investment law. 
Order 39 is the only CPA-issued order that defines “foreign 
investment” in post-invasion Iraqi law. “Foreign investment” is said to 
include investment by a foreign investor “in any kind of asset in Iraq, 
including tangible and intangible property, and related property 
rights, shares and other forms of participation in a business entity, and 
intellectual property rights and technical expertise…”321 The inclusion 
of technical expertise brought the array of international service 
providers and consultants contracted during the reconstruction period 
(discussed at 2.1) under the umbrella of these foreign investment 
provisions. Second, foreign investment is permitted in all regions and 
economic sectors of Iraq with the exception of banking and primary 
extraction and initial processing in natural resources.322 Many Iraqi 
government officials assert that closing the oil and gas sector to 
international investors resulted only from protests by Iraqi advisors 
appointed by the CPA.323 Third, the Order purports to grant national 
treatment to foreign investors, and where an international treaty 
signed by Iraq provides more favorable terms for foreign investors, 
those terms apply.324 It is worth recalling that the CPA-introduced 
provisions granting foreign investors immunity from Iraqi law and tax 
liability (discussed at 2.2 and 2.3 respectively) provided foreign 
investors with privileges unavailable to national investors. Fourth, the 
Order grants foreign investors broad ownership and management 
rights, including the right to 100 percent ownership of Iraqi assets and 
to establish wholly foreign-owned businesses in Iraq.325 Fifth, the 
order permits tax-free remittances of profits earned in Iraq, including 
profits from disposition of the entire foreign investment.326 Sixth, the 
                                                            
321 Order 39, supra note 4 at 1(3) (emphasis mine).  
322 Ibid at 6(1). 
323 Klein, supra note 2 at 361. 
324 Order 39, supra note 4, ss 4(1), 14. 
325 Ibid, ss 7(1)(a), 7(2)(b).  
326 Order 39, supra note 4, s 7(2)(d)(i). 
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Order prohibits foreign ownership of real property, but permits the 
assignment of licenses to use such property for 40-year terms.327 
Seventh, foreign investors have the option to designate the dispute 
settlement mechanism of their choice in any contract concluded with 
Iraqi entities, including international arbitration.328 Because the Order 
holds that all conflicting legal texts are deemed to be void and that 
dispute settlement mechanisms under Iraqi law are optional, the 
Order appears to limit resort to domestic Iraqi remedies unless a 
foreign investor and local entity agree to this option in writing.329 
Finally, the Order purports to replace all existing foreign investment 
law in Iraq, which underscores the sweeping nature of the reforms it 
introduced.330  
 
2.5 The CPA Investment Regime after Occupation 
The regime discussed above continued to influence the foreign 
investment climate in Iraq beyond the dissolution of the CPA on 28 
June 2004. The final order issued by the CPA stipulated that anti-
Ba’ath, tax, and foreign investment provisions would remain in force 
“unless and until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted 
and having the force of law…”331 The CPA also revised Order 17 to 
ensure that foreign contractors would continue to enjoy immunity in 
matters relating to their contracts, duty-free imports and exports, and 
exemptions from Iraqi tax on local purchases and income earned in 
Iraq “until the departure of the final element of the [Multi-National 
Force] from Iraq, unless rescinded or amended by legislation duly 
enacted and having the force of law.”332 Through a combination of UN 
Security Council resolutions recognizing the interim Iraqi 
government that succeeded the CPA and provisions in the 
concomitant interim Iraqi constitution, the CPA’s extension of the 
applicability of regulations it had issued beyond its dissolution was 
                                                            
327 Ibid, ss 8(1) and 8(2). 
328 Ibid, s 10. 
329 Ibid, ss 10, 13. 
330 Ibid, s 3(1). 
331 Order Number 100: Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued 
by the Coalition Provisional Authority (28 June 2004) at preamble. 
332 Order Number 17 (Revised): Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF-
Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, Coalition Provisional Authority (June 
27, 2004), ss 4, 8(a), 8(b), 10, 20. 
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confirmed in international and Iraqi law.333  
Many incentives foreign investors enjoyed under the CPA 
investment scheme were also either continued or broadened under 
the Iraqi investment law that eventually replaced Order 39 in 2006. 334 
That law guaranteed national treatment of foreign investors, 
permitted 100 percent foreign ownership of Iraqi assets, allowed for 
international arbitration, and provided a range of exemptions from tax 
and import / export fees.335 Unlike the CPA scheme, the Iraqi law that 
replaced Order 39 permitted both foreign ownership of Iraqi land for 
the purpose of executing housing projects, and foreign leasing of lands 
for 50-year terms with the possibility of renewal, which is 10 years 
more than was permitted under CPA regulations.336   
 
3. ASSESSING THE CPA INVESTMENT SCHEME: US POLICY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The CPA investment scheme is now compared to US policy 
pronouncements to test the extent to which it reflects ideological 
commitments articulated before the war (discussed at 1.1). This 
section also introduces the question of whether the CPA had the legal 
authority to reform Iraqi investment law in the manner and to the 
extent that it did (at 3.2).   
 
3.1 Order 39 and US Foreign Policy 
As early as 2002, US policy was committed to the view that 
                                                            
333 Resolution 1511 (2003), UNSC, 2003, S/RES/1511; Resolution 1546 (2004), UNSC, 
2004, S/RES/1546; Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional 
Period, Iraqi Governing Council (in force 28 June 2004), s 26(c). The arrangements 
relating to legal immunities were eventually superseded by the 2008 US—Iraq Status 
of Forces Agreement that maintained the immunity of US forces acting in their 
official capacity from Iraqi legal procedure, but established Iraqi jurisdiction over US 
contractors operating in Iraq. See Agreement Between the United States of America 
and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the 
Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, 17 
November 2008, Article 12 (Jurisdiction).  
334 Law No (13) of 2006: The Investment Law, Republic of Iraq (2006) as amended in 
2010 [Law No (13)].  
335 Ibid, ss 10(1), 10(3)(c), 15, 27, 17. 
336 Ibid, ss 10(2), 10(3)(a). 
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international investment was a key to development. “Market 
economies” were seen as the “best way to promote prosperity and 
reduce poverty” and foreign investment was necessary to “invigorate 
Iraq’s economy and lift the Iraqi people out of a future of 
impoverishment.”337  The opening words of Order 39 demonstrate 
how the CPA applied these commitments to law reform in Iraq: 
“Determined to improve the conditions of life, technical skills, and 
opportunities for all Iraqis and to fight unemployment with its 
associated deleterious effect on public security…”338  
The CPA investment regime also reflects more specific 
assertions by the US State Department that Iraq’s infrastructure “upon 
liberation will be in need of billions of dollars of foreign direct 
investment” and that “creating a favorable investment climate for 
foreign investors” would be a necessary first step.339 Order 39 declares 
that “facilitating foreign investment will help to develop 
infrastructure, foster the growth of Iraqi business, create jobs, raise 
capital, result in the introduction of new technology into Iraq and 
promote the transfer of knowledge and skills to Iraqis…”340 Most 
significantly, the US pledge to promote liberal investment laws in host 
states—“pro-growth legal and regulatory policies”—is clearly 
reflected in Order 39: 
This Order promotes and safeguards the general welfare and 
interests of the Iraqi people by promoting foreign 
investment through the protection of the rights and property 
of foreign investors in Iraq and the regulation through 
transparent processes of matters relating to foreign 
investment in Iraq.  This Order specifies the terms and 
procedures for making foreign investments and is intended 
to attract new foreign investment to Iraq.341 
Order 39 thereby mirrors a pre-invasion US policy commitment to 
encourage foreign investment in developing economies through law 
reform.  
                                                            
337 NSS, supra note 1 at 17; FIP—Economy & Infrastructure, supra note 13 at 5. 
338 Order 39, supra note 4 at preamble. 
339 FIP—Oil & Energy, supra note 12 at 9; FIP—Economy & Infrastructure, supra note 
13 at 5.  
340 NSS, supra note 1 at 17. 
341 Order 39, supra note 4, s 2. 
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3.2 CPA Reforms and International Law 
The manner in, and extent to which, the CPA reformed Iraqi 
investment law may have been in contravention of international law. 
Although a conclusive determination of whether the CPA had the 
authority under international law to introduce the regulations 
discussed in Part 2 is beyond the scope of this paper, the question may 
be of interest to both foreign investors and the state of Iraq, and either 
may wish to seek remedies for investment agreements concluded in 
this period.  
The parameters for the exercise of authority by occupying 
forces in Iraq are grounded in Security Council Resolutions and 
international humanitarian law. There appears to be consensus among 
the small number of scholars who have analyzed this issue that the 
CPA exercised authority pursuant to, and within the boundaries of, 
applicable international humanitarian law, customary international 
law and relevant Security Council resolutions.342 The CPA itself 
claimed the authority to govern occupied Iraq on the basis of Security 
Council resolutions and the laws of war. Regulation Number 1 asserts 
that the CPA exercises authority “under relevant U.N. Security 
Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (22 May 2003), and 
the laws and usages of war.”343 All CPA Orders begin with a similar 
declaration in the name of Paul Bremer, Administrator of the CPA. 
Order 1, for example, opens with the following: “Pursuant to my 
authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, and the laws and 
usages of war …”344  
Although similar provisions from other Orders do not include 
the reference to “the laws and usages of war,” all CPA orders refer 
either to “relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions” or to Resolution 
1483. This resolution, which predates all but the first CPA Order and 
Regulation, refers to the CPA as the unified command of the 
“occupying powers” and calls for the CPA to “comply fully with [its] 
obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.”345  The CPA 
                                                            
342 See e.g. Crum, supra note 2. 
343 Regulation Number 1, Coalition Provisional Authority (16 May 2003), s 1(2). 
344 Order 1, supra note 16 at preamble. 
345 Resolution 1483 (2003), UNSC, 2003, S/RES/1483 at preamble, 5 [Resolution 1483]. 
   
99 
 
therefore appears bound as an occupying power by applicable 
international humanitarian law irrespective of whether its Orders and 
Regulations refer explicitly to “the laws and usages of war.”  
International law constrained the CPA’s ability to issue 
investment laws. For example, Resolution 1483 and the fourth Hague 
Convention of 1907 [Hague IV] limit the authority of occupying 
powers to alter the legal framework of the jurisdiction being 
occupied.346 Article 43 notes that once an occupier assumes authority, 
it “shall take all the measures in his [sic] power to restore, and ensure, 
as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”347 Similarly, 
operative paragraph 4 of Resolution 1483 calls on the CPA to work 
towards “the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can 
freely determine their own political future.”348 These provisions 
appear to limit CPA authority with respect to international 
investment in three ways. First, the CPA could not alter domestic 
Iraqi law unless absolutely prevented from doing so. Second, any such 
changes would have to be made in accordance with Iraqi law already 
in force.349 And third, the CPA would arguably be barred from issuing 
provisions on international investment (such as guarantees against 
expropriation) if this would limit the purview of future Iraqi 
governments to “freely determine their own political future.”  
Hague IV and Resolution 1483 also appear to limit the 
exercise of CPA authority by circumscribing the permissible uses of 
Iraqi assets. Article 55 of Hague IV limits the use of “public buildings, 
real estate, forests, and agricultural assets” in the occupied country by 
requiring the occupying power to “safeguard the capital of these 
properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of 
usufruct.”350 Similarly, Resolution 1483 calls on the CPA to “promote 
the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of 
the territory.”351 It appears that the CPA was, therefore, limited in its 
                                                            
346 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, International 
Conferences (The Hague) 18 October 1907 [Hague Convention IV]. 
347 Ibid at article 43 (emphasis mine). 
348 Resolution 1483 supra note 70 at 4. 
349 Crum, supra note 2 at 72, 115. 
350 Hague Convention IV, supra note 71 at 55. 
351 Resolution 1483, supra note 70 at 4. 
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ability to enter into agreements with foreign investors that would 
result in Iraqi state assets being disposed of in a manner not in the best 
interest or for the welfare of Iraqis.  
Whether the CPA violated international law either by 
reforming Iraqi investment law in the manner or to the extent that it 
did, or by concluding agreements under those investment laws that 
disposed of Iraqi assets improperly is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, because of the potential implications for foreign investors 
and for the state of Iraq, the question warrants further study.  
 
4. ASSESSING THE CPA INVESTMENT SCHEME: THREE 
FRAMEWORKS 
 
The combination of CPA tax, immunity, and foreign 
investment provisions presented a number of incentives for, and few 
restrictions on, foreign investment in post-invasion Iraq. However, 
analysis of the CPA investment scheme to date has either been 
general and categorical (“an anti-Marshall Plan”) or limited to a 
particular CPA Order.352 Few if any studies have assessed the CPA 
investment scheme as a whole or with reference to objective criteria. 
Three frameworks of analysis prove useful in this regard: the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) 
framework on “host country operational measures” (“HCOMs”); the 
UNCTAD framework on foreign investment policy instruments 
(“PIs”); and the World Bank International Finance Corporation 
(“World Bank”) framework for investment law reform. The goal of 
this part of the paper is to test objectively the extent to which CPA-
issued regulations on foreign investment represent a pro-investor legal 
regime.    
 
4.1 Assessing the CPA Investment Regime: The Host Country 
Operational Measures Framework 
The CPA-instituted foreign investment scheme ranks among 
the most investor-friendly possible according to the UNCTAD 
                                                            
352 Klein, supra note 2 at 347; See e.g. Crum, supra note 2; See also Clarence M. Dass, 
“Adventure Capitalizing in Baghdad: An Entrepreneurial Approach to Reconstructing 
Iraq” (2009) 4 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 157. 
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categorization of HCOMs.353 The HCOM framework evaluates 
measures that target international investment directly through 
restrictions or performance requirements. “Red light” HCOMs, 
including local content or trade-balancing requirements, foreign 
exchange restrictions, or export controls are considered the most 
restrictive and the least foreign investor-friendly.354 The CPA issued 
no such restrictions or requirements. “Yellow light” or intermediate 
category HCOMs include common requirements or standards imposed 
on foreign investment.355 As Table 1 below demonstrates, the CPA 
investment scheme contains none of these typical requirements or 
standards: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
353 “The Development Dimension of FDI: Policy and Rule-Making Perspectives”, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/4 
(2003) at 6 [UNCTAD Development]. 
354 Ibid at 5. 
355 Ibid. 
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Table 1: CPA Investment Scheme and Typical Host Country 
Operational Measures 
 
“Yellow Light” Host Country Operational 
Measures356 
CPA Investment 
Scheme (Orders 17, 
37, 39, 49) 
-Requirements to locate headquarters for a specific 
region 
No 
-Employment performance requirements No 
-Export performance requirements No 
-Restrictions on sales of goods or services in the 
territory where produced or provided 
No 
-Requirements to supply goods or services to specific 
region exclusively from a territory 
No 
-Requirements to act as the sole supplier of goods 
produced or services provided 
No 
-Requirements to transfer technology, production 
processes or other proprietary knowledge 
No 
-Research and development requirements No 
-Measures contrary to the principle of fair and 
equitable treatment 
No (better of national 
or other treatment 
provided by treaty) 
-Requirements to establish a joint venture with 
domestic participation 
No (full foreign 
ownership permitted) 
-Requirements for a minimum level of domestic 
equity participation 
No (full foreign 
ownership permitted) 
 
All measures not categorized as “red light” or “yellow light” 
HCOMs fall into the “green light” category. The right of host 
countries to impose such measures is uncontested in international 
investment agreements.357 However, the CPA scheme includes only 
one “green light” HCOM: a prohibition on foreign investment in the 
banking and hydrocarbon sectors.358 As discussed above (at 2.4), this 
measure was only introduced as a result of Iraqi pressure on the CPA. 
In sum, the HCOM framework demonstrates the extent to which the 
CPA investment scheme is pro-foreign investor: it includes no “red 
                                                            
356 All “‘Yellow Light’ Host Country Operational Measures” from UNCTAD 
Development, supra note 78 at 6.  
357 “Host Country Operational Measures”, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/26 (2001) at 48. 
358 Order 39, supra note 4, s 6(1). 
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light” or “yellow light” restrictions typically imposed on foreign 
investment, and the sole “green light” restriction it does include was 
not a CPA initiative. 
 
4.2 Assessing the CPA Investment Regime: The Policy Instruments 
Framework 
The CPA-instituted foreign investment scheme also rates 
among the most investor-friendly according to the UNCTAD 
framework on foreign investment PIs. Unlike the HCOM framework 
that focuses only on restrictions and performance requirements, the 
foreign investment PI analysis considers all regulatory and incentive 
measures relevant to foreign investment.  As Table 2 below shows, 
CPA PIs contain only two regulatory measures among those typically 
available to policy makers: restrictions on foreign investment in 
banking and hydrocarbons, and limitations of foreign land ownership. 
However, as discussed above, the former was not part of the initial 
foreign investment scheme and was introduced only at the insistence 
of the CPA’s Iraqi advisors; the latter is mitigated by the fact that 
Order 39 authorizes the leasing of Iraqi land to foreign investors for 
up to 40 years with the possibility of renewal. At the same time, CPA 
PIs provide many of the fiscal, financial, and other incentive measures 
available to policy makers. The PI analysis therefore also demonstrates 
the extent to which the CPA investment scheme is intensely pro-
foreign investor. 
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Table 2: CPA Investment Scheme and Typical Foreign Investment Regulatory Measures and Incentives 
Admission and Establishment Regulatory Measures359 Ownership and Control Regulatory Measures 
 
Possible Measures 
CPA Investment 
Scheme 
 
Possible Measures 
CPA Investment 
Scheme 
-Restrictions on numbers of multinationals 
-Minimum capital requirements  
-Subsequent additional capital inputs  
-Screening, authorization, registration  
-Entry conditions – Meeting criteria 
(environment)  
-Legal form requirements of FDI  
-Restrictions on entry modalities   
-Special requirements for non-equity  
-FDI to specific locations (moderate urban 
drift)  
-Restrictions of imported input factors  
-Deposit requirements prior to FDI  
-Admission to hosts privatization deals 
restricted  
-Admission and incorporation fees (taxes)  
-Compliances with norms (customs, public 
morals) 
-Sectors ring-fenced from FDI  
 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes (banking, 
hydrocarbons) 
-Equity limits on foreign ownership (e.g. less 
than 50 per cent) 
-Mandatory transfer of ownership 
-Nationality limitation on equity held 
-Restrictions on foreign loans (bonds) 
-Restrictions on stocks and share types held 
by foreign investor 
-Restrictions on types of share transfers 
-Restrictions on foreign share holders 
(dividend, capital) 
-‘Golden’ shares held by host 
-Government appoint reservations to board 
-Restrictions on nationality of directors 
-Government reserves right to veto certain 
decisions 
-Government reserves rights to be consulted 
prior to decisions 
-Restrictions on land rights transfers 
 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No  
Yes (no foreign 
ownership of land, 40-
year leases only) 
 
                                                            
359 All “possible measures” from “FDI Policy Instruments: Advantages and Disadvantages”, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 
Research and Statistics Branch Working Paper 01/2009 (2009) at 20. 
     
105 
 
Operations Regulatory Measures Foreign Direct Investment Incentive Measures 
 
Possible Measures 
CPA Investment 
Scheme 
 
Possible Measures 
CPA Investment 
Scheme 
-Employment restrictions on foreign staff   
-Performance requirements (local 
sourcing, employment, training)  
-Import, export, sales, foreign exchange 
earnings 
-Restrictions on public procurement 
-Restricted access to local factors inputs 
-Restrictions on diversification, on access 
to communications 
-Restrictions on free flow of government 
data  
-Operation restriction on public utilities  
-Restrictions on access to local credit  
-Restrictions on foreign exchange, capital 
repatriation  
-“Cultural” restrictions  
-Information disclosure requirements  
-Operational permits / licenses, technical 
standards, royalty ceilings  
-Advertising restrictions on foreign 
multinationals 
-Special restrictions on sector operations 
(banks)  
 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes (banking, 
hydrocarbons) 
 
Fiscal Incentives 
-Losses against future profits 
-Accelerated capital depreciation 
-Investment / Reinvestment permits 
-Lower social security payments 
-Tax reductions based on staff and 
marketing expenses 
-Import-based incentives (duty exemptions) 
-Export-based incentives (duty exemptions) 
-Reductions in corporate tax rates & 
holidays 
 
Financial Incentives 
-Loan guarantees and public venture capital 
availabilities 
-Guaranteed export credits and Government 
insurance 
-Direct subsidies and subsidized loans 
  
Other Incentives 
-Subsidized dedicated infrastructure, 
services, government contracts 
 
Yes 
Yes 
(not addressed) 
Yes (none) 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  (max15%) / No 
contractor tax 
 
No 
Available 
No 
 
 
Yes 
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4.3 Assessing the CPA Investment Regime: The Investment Law 
Reform Framework 
Evaluating the CPA investment scheme according to the 
World Bank framework for investment law reform yields a similar 
result. The Bank’s blueprint for domestic investment laws is designed 
to attract foreign investment: 
As stated above, conducive investment policies are those 
that support and enable private investment, including 
foreign investment. They ensure ease of market entry and 
exit and access to inputs investors need. They impose few 
restrictions on sectors in which investors can invest, how 
they can invest, and how much they can invest.1  
As Table 3 below shows, the CPA investment scheme includes all of 
the substantive and nonsubstantive qualities advocated for by the 
Bank for inclusion in investment codes designed to attract foreign 
investment. On flexibility in investor entry, the Bank notes that none 
of the world’s largest foreign investment recipients has “a completely 
open entry regime.”2 However, “the ideal framework is a liberal entry 
regime” with no minimum capital requirements for investors.3 The 
CPA investment scheme contains no such requirements. On investors’ 
rights and guarantees, the Bank assets that “most investors expect a 
country to guarantee them, at a minimum, the rights and protections 
listed below.”4 The CPA investment scheme guarantees foreign 
investors all of the rights and protections outlined by the Bank. 
Finally, the Bank argues that “good investment policies” are 
characterized by clarity, stability, and transparency as defined by the 
Bank. The CPA investment scheme also reflects these features. In 
short, the CPA-installed investment scheme includes all of the 
features that are advocated for by the World Bank into domestic law 
and more closely resembles the Bank’s ideal “liberal entry regime” 
than any of the world’s largest recipients of foreign investment.  
 
 
                                                            
1 “Investment Law Reform: A Handbook for Development Practitioners”, Investment 
Climate Advisory Services of the World Bank Group (June 2010) at 8 [World Bank]. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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Table 3: CPA Investment Scheme and World Bank Guidelines for 
Investment Law 
 
World Bank Guidelines on Best Practices for 
Investment Law to Promote Investment and 
Protect Investors5 
CPA Investment Scheme 
Substantive Qualities of Conducive Policies 
Flexibility in Investor Entry 
-No mandatory minimum capital requirement for 
investors 
Yes 
-No requirement for governmental institutional 
screen in foreign investment 
Yes 
Investors’ Rights and Guarantees 
-Nondiscrimination (national or equal treatment) Yes (national or treaty 
treatment) 
-Right to ownership Yes (full foreign 
ownership) 
-Convertibility and repatriation of capital and 
earnings 
Yes (full repatriation of 
profit) 
-Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms Yes (up to contracting 
parties) 
-Expatriate labour Yes (no local 
employment req’d) 
-Security of investment (no arbitrary 
nationalization or unlawful expropriation or 
confiscation) 
Constructive (Order 39 
protects investments and 
overrules any conflicting 
law; the Iraqi 
constitution of 2006 
guarantees against 
expropriation) 
 
 
 
                                                            
5 All “guidelines” from World Bank, supra note 85 at 8-10. 
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Nonsubstantive Qualities of Conducive Policies 
Transparency 
-Public documentation of investment laws Yes 
-Nondiscretionary—decisions made on objective 
criteria 
Yes 
Clarity 
-Simply stated so understandable by everyone Yes 
-Unambiguous language to avoid disputes Yes 
Stability 
-Predictable (avoid jeopardizing legitimate 
expectations) 
Yes (fixed by transitional 
laws) 
-Comprehensive and complete to avoid 
“surprises” 
Yes (replaces all 
conflicting law) 
 
Evaluating CPA provisions on tax, immunities, and foreign 
investment using these three frameworks confirms that the CPA 
introduced a highly pro-foreign investor legal regime in post-invasion 
Iraq. The UNCTAD and World Bank criteria also show how foreign 
investors in post-invasion Iraq faced few of the typical restrictions on 
foreign investment while benefitting from a broad range of incentive 
measures.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A detailed analysis of CPA Orders on de-Ba’athification, 
immunities, tax, and foreign investment demonstrates the extent to 
which the CPA introduced a highly pro-investor legal regime in Iraq 
starting in 2003, as hypothesized. Applying the UNCTAD and World 
Bank frameworks for assessing host country foreign investment 
policies and laws, it is difficult to imagine a more investor-friendly 
collection of incentives and restrictions than those issued by the CPA. 
This appears to validate the common perception, although not based 
on a detailed analysis of CPA regulations, that Iraqi investment law in 
this period embodied “the kind of wish-list that foreign investors and 
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donor agencies dream of for developing markets.”6 
Much of the legal regime governing foreign investment in Iraq 
remains to be explored. For example, the manner in and extent to 
which the CPA reformed Iraqi investment law may not have been 
authorized by international law. A finding of illegality would have 
significant implications for foreign investors who concluded contracts 
under the CPA regime and the Iraqi state. Moreover, the current 
regulations on foreign investment in Iraq remain understudied. This 
paper hopes to contribute to future study by establishing a detailed 
picture of the legal regime governing foreign investment in Iraq 
installed in the aftermath of the invasion of 2003.  
 
                                                            
6 “Let’s All Go to the Yard Sale”, The Economist (25 September 2003). 
